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Executive Summary
Contract farming may be defined as agricultural 
production carried out according to a prior agree­
ment in which the farmer commits to producing a 
given product in a given manner and the buyer 
commits to purchasing it. Often, the buyer pro­
vides the farmer with technical assistance, seeds, 
fertilizer, and other inputs on credit and offers a 
guaranteed price for the output. Proponents of 
contract farming argue that it links small-scale 
farmers to lucrative markets and solves a number 
of problems small-scale farmers face in diversifying 
into high-value commodities. Opponents argue that 
the imbalance in power between the buyer [often a 
large agribusiness company] and the farmer leads to 
an agreement unfavorable to the farmer. Also, they 
argue that small farmers are often excluded from 
contract farming schemes, resulting in greater 
income inequality and social tensions in rural areas.
To understand the rationale for contract farming, it 
is useful to view it as one form of vertical coordi­
nation, in between spot markets [in which supply 
and demand are coordinated through prices alone] 
and vertical integration [in which supply and 
demand are coordinated by having one firm carry 
out multiple stages in the market channel]. Transac­
tion cost economics, a branch of new institutional 
economics, suggests that, because contracting 
involves costs, it is economically justifiable only [1] 
when the buyer is a large firm [a processor, 
exporter, or supermarket chain]; [2] when the 
product is characterized by large quality variations, 
perishability, technically difficult production, 
and/or a high value-bulk ratio; [3] when the desti­
nation market is willing to pay a premium for 
certain product or production attributes that can 
be ensured only by close coordination between 
farmers and buyers; and [4] when the policy 
environment is conducive.
The vast majority of empirical studies suggest that 
contract farming schemes generally raise the 
income of farmers participating in the schemes. The 
evidence is less clear on the degree to which buyers 
are willing to contract with small-scale farmers— the 
answer depends on the commodity, the market, 
and the policy environment.
Contract farming can be promoted with a favorable 
investment climate, deregulation of direct trans­
actions between companies and farms, the devel­
opment of grades and standards, facilitation of 
farmer organizations to link farmers and firms, 
cooperation with private firms on provision of 
extension services, provision of mediation services, 
and exploration of innovative ways to enforce 
contracts.
Contract farming cannot serve as a broad-based 
strategy for rural development because it only 
makes economic sense for certain commodities in 
certain markets. On the other hand, in those 
circumstances, it can be an effective institution for 
helping small farmers raise their productivity and 
orient their production toward more remunerative 
commodities and markets.
Your assignment is to recommend a set of policies 
to be considered by a developing-country govern­
ment to facilitate contract farming for fruits and 
vegetables that will benefit low-income farmers, 
taking into account stakeholders' interests.
Background
Small farmers in developing countries face a 
number of constraints that limit their productivity.1 
First, they lack information about production 
methods and market opportunities, particularly for 
new crops and varieties. Second, even with 
sufficient information about profitable investments, 
small farmers often lack the necessary financial 
reserves, and access to credit is limited by the lack 
of collateral. Third, small farmers operating near 
subsistence are understandably more risk averse 
than larger farmers. They generally prefer to assure 
themselves a minimum supply of food before 
expanding commercial production for an uncertain 
market.
1 A  "small farmer" is defined as one who relies primarily 
on family labor with modest or only occasional use of 
hired labor, in many developing countries, this definition 
would correspond to farms of less than three to five 
hectares.
Contract farming has attracted the interest of 
researchers and policymakers because it has the 
potential to solve several of these constraints 
simultaneously. Contract farming may be defined as 
agricultural production carried out according to a 
prior agreement in which the farmer commits to 
producing a given product in a given manner and 
the buyer commits to purchasing it. Often, the 
buyer provides the farmer with technical assistance, 
seeds, fertilizer, and other inputs on credit and 
offers a guaranteed price for the output [Eaton and 
Shepherd 2001].
Although reliable estimates are not available, inter­
national trends in agriculture suggest that the pre­
valence of contract farming may well be increasing 
in developing countries. The growth of high-value 
agriculture, the expansion of agricultural processing 
in developing countries, the consolidation in the 
retail food sector, and the increased demand for 
quality and food safety are all driving the need for 
vertical coordination in agricultural supply chains 
[Gulati et al. 2006],
Contract farming is the subject of some contro­
versy, however. Among proponents, contract 
farming is seen as a solution to the problems of 
information, credit, and market risk that small 
farmers face in commercial production. They see 
contract farming as facilitating the integration of 
small farmers into commercial agriculture, leading 
to income growth and poverty reduction. Critics, 
on the other hand, see contract farming as a way 
for large firms to take advantage of the land and 
poverty of small farmers, effectively paying them 
less than the minimum wage and "taking control" 
of their farms. The integration of small farmers 
into commercial agriculture is seen as a negative 
trend, leading to higher risk, indebtedness, and 
income inequality (Little and Watts 1994; Singh 
2002],
This case describes the role of contract farming in 
agricultural development, focusing on its impact on 
small farmers in developing countries. In particular, 
the paper has three objectives:
■ to describe the economic rationale for 
contract farming as a way to organize agri­
cultural production,
■ to review previous research on the impact 
of contract farming on small farmers, and
■ to identify key stakeholders and derive 
some implications for development policy.
Contract Farming as a Form of Vertical 
Coordination
All markets require some form of vertical 
coordination— that is, coordination of supply and 
demand between different participants in the 
marketing channel, such as farmers, processors, 
wholesalers, and retailers. Consider the example of 
a maize farmer in the western highlands of Kenya. 
If the farmer intends to sell some of the maize 
harvest, he or she needs to know what kind of 
maize is in demand, where and when to sell it, and 
what price it is likely to sell for. Similarly, a maize­
milling company in Nairobi needs to know what 
kind of maize will be available for purchase, where 
to buy it, when it will be harvested, and how much 
it will cost. This type of vertical coordination 
problem exists throughout the marketing 
channel— for example, between processors and 
wholesalers and between wholesalers and retailers—  
but the focus here is on the relationship between 
farmers and the buyer of the agricultural output.
Often farmers sell in spot markets, involving 
transactions between buyers and sellers that involve 
no commitments outside the transaction itself. In 
this case, coordination of supply and demand with 
respect to quantity, quality, and timing occurs only 
through the price. Farmers learn that prices are 
higher in Nairobi than in the local district market, 
higher in the off-season than during the harvest, 
and so on, and they respond to this information. 
Similarly, buyers learn how prices vary over the 
seasons and throughout the country, and they 
adjust their procurement strategy accordingly.
Sometimes, vertical coordination between buyers 
and sellers is accomplished with informal or formal 
agreements with regard to price, quantity, timing, 
and product attributes. For example, the maize 
processor may approach the farmer before planting 
season and agree to buy one ton of maize at 
harvest time for a fixed price, assuming the maize 
meets a certain quality standard. The marketing 
contract works when both the farmer and the 
buyer gain from having the terms of sale arranged 
in advance. In some cases, this level of coordination 
is not enough, and the processor also provides 
agricultural inputs and technical assistance on 
credit. This resource-providing contract makes
sense when the buyer has more information about 
production methods or wants to ensure a level of 
quality or food safety. For example, the buyer may 
specify the types of pesticides that can be used and 
the timing of their application to  be certain that 
pesticide residue standards are met. Finally, some 
production management contracts specify the 
manner in which the commodity is to be grown, 
such as the planting density, use of pesticides, and 
timing of harvest (Martinez 2002],
O f course, contracts involve costs for both farmers 
and buyers. The buyer must draft a contract, 
educate potential farmers about the terms of the 
contract, sign up participants, monitor compliance 
with the contract, and develop a strategy for 
enforcing the contract. The farmer makes a 
commitment to sell to a buyer at a given price and 
gives up some autonomy in production decisions. 
In order for contract farming to  be worthwhile to 
both parties, the gains from reducing transaction 
costs must exceed the costs of establishing the 
contract.
The tightest form of vertical coordination is 
vertical integration, in which agricultural 
production and processing are carried out within 
the same company. Instead of dealing with contract 
farmers who are farming their own land, the 
company purchases (or leases] farmland and hires 
farm workers. Clearly, the company has more 
control over how the product is grown and 
harvested when it owns the land and hires the 
labor, but there are disadvantages as well. For 
example, farm workers are paid by the day, so they 
are less motivated than independent farmers and 
require closer supervision. In addition, it is more 
difficult and costly to adjust output when the firm 
produces on its own land.
What determines whether a given supply channel 
uses spot markets, contracts, or vertical 
integration? The most useful way to analyze vertical 
coordination is with the new institutional 
economics (NIE], Traditional neoclassical economics 
tends to assume that the institutions (defined here 
as the laws, codes, and social norms that define 
acceptable behavior] are given, whereas NIE looks 
specifically at the factors that shape the design of 
economic institutions (Grosh 1994], One branch of 
NIE, called transaction cost economics (TCE], 
explains relations between buyers and sellers in 
terms of the costs of carrying out transactions,
including finding a buyer, negotiating a price, 
delivering the commodity, and obtaining payment, 
as well as the risks associated with the transaction, 
including the risk of being cheated (Williamson 
2 0 0 0 ], The costs of carrying out a transaction can 
be considerable and can be exacerbated by three 
problems:
■ Imperfect information— The buyer and 
seller never have all the relevant 
information they need to negotiate the 
terms of the transaction. Often the seller 
has more information about the quality of 
the product, but the buyer has better 
information about the market. This 
information asymmetry prevents markets 
from operating efficiently.
■ Limited ability to process information—  
Even if the buyer and seller had all the 
relevant information, they would not have 
the time or capacity to analyze it 
thoroughly, a problem sometimes called 
bounded rationality.
■ Dishonesty— The buyer and seller can 
never fully trust each other, since each has 
some short-run incentive to misrepresent 
the truth and violate the terms of their 
agreement. This is called opportunistic 
behavior.
Because of imperfect information, sellers must 
spend time finding potential buyers and negotiating 
over the price. Buyers have imperfect information 
about the product they are purchasing, which 
sometimes means they must inspect it before 
purchase. The possibility of dishonest behavior 
means that buyers and sellers cannot simply rely on 
the claims of potential trading partners; they must 
take into account the possibility of being cheated. 
And limited ability to process information means 
that there is little incentive to exhaustively research 
all their options. Even after gathering information, 
they still must decide on the basis of incomplete 
information.
Formal and informal economic institutions are 
designed to address these problems by facilitating 
communications, disseminating information, and 
punishing dishonest behavior. For example:
■ the legal system helps to enforce contracts 
and limit opportunistic behavior;
■ trade associations and better business 
bureaus help to discourage dishonesty by 
establishing codes of conduct and by 
identifying and exposing firms that use 
unscrupulous practices;
■ grades and standards are used to define 
quality and facilitate negotiations;
■ credit bureaus reduce the risk faced by 
lenders and discourage discretionary 
default; and
■ informal codes of conduct serve to outline 
acceptable behavior in transactions.
These institutions, however, cannot eliminate all 
costs and risks associated with carrying out a 
transaction, particularly in developing countries 
where the legal system and other institutions are 
less well developed. And within developing 
countries, the issues of transaction costs are 
particularly relevant in the agricultural sector 
because of the perishability of the product, the 
geographic dispersion of agricultural production, 
and farmers' limited resources and access to 
information.
The risks of opportunistic behavior are even 
greater when the buyer or seller must make certain 
investments that are only useful for carrying out a 
transaction with the other party. For example, to 
grow coffee, farmers must invest in planting coffee 
trees, which take four to five years to begin 
producing. After farmers make the investment, 
their negotiating position is seriously weakened and 
the buyer may be tempted to lower the price, 
particularly if there are no other processors in the 
area. Realizing this, farmers are understandably 
reluctant to make the investment in the first place. 
Because of this problem of asset specificity, farmers 
may not be willing to  invest in producing a 
commodity, even if there is a price at which both 
farmers and processors earn profits.
Asset specificity may be an issue for the buyer as 
well. If a processing plant is designed to  handle just 
one commodity, the processor is "locked" into that 
sector and depends on a steady supply of the raw 
material. If there are only a few suppliers and the 
buyer is concerned about collusion among them, 
the incentive to invest in the processing plant will 
be reduced. This problem is probably less severe 
for buyers than for farmers, however, because 
there are often many suppliers, making collusion
difficult. As discussed later, this may be an 
important incentive for processors to work with a 
large number of smaller farmers rather than a small 
number of large farmers.
Conditions under Which Contract Farming 
Makes Sense
Under what conditions will contract farming be 
profitable for both growers and buyers? This brief 
discusses the role of three factors: [1] the type of 
buyer, [2] the type of commodity, and [3] the type 
of destination market.
Type o f buyer. What types of buyers are more 
likely to organize a contract farming scheme? 
Setting up a contract farming scheme involves large 
fixed costs2: the buyer needs a team of field agents 
who negotiate terms with farmers, distribute 
inputs, provide technical assistance, and collect the 
product. As a result, contracting is generally not 
worthwhile for traditional wholesalers or other 
small- and medium-scale buyers. Rather, the buyers 
in a contract farming scheme are more likely to be 
large-scale processors, exporters, or supermarket 
chains. In addition, buyers with large capital- 
intensive processing plants have more incentive to 
contract with farmers because they need a steady 
and reliable flow of raw materials to maintain a high 
capacity-utilization rate. This is particularly true if 
the plant purchases a large share of the locally 
available product, since there is more risk of supply 
shortfalls owing to weather or changes in the 
market. For example, the profitability of a sugar 
mill is dependent on having a steady flow of sugar­
cane over the year, including supplies before and 
after the peak harvest season. Sugar mills often use 
contract farming to stagger production over the 
season and increase capacity, in addition, because 
sugarcane is bulky and perishable, it cannot be 
transported far, and sugar mills often purchase a 
large share of the cane available in a given area 
[Sartorius et al. 2004 ],
Type o f agricultural commodity. What types of 
agricultural commodities are more likely to be pro­
duced using contract farming? If a product is 
homogeneous and nonperishable, if quality is easily 
observed, and if farmers are familiar with the pro­
duction methods and market requirements, then
2 Fixed costs refer to costs that do not vary with the 
scale of production. In contrast, variable costs are those 
that increase with the volume of production.
transaction costs are low. In this case, there is no 
need to incur the costs associated with contracts, 
so spot markets will be more efficient. These fac­
tors explain why spot markets are the standard 
form of vertical coordination between farmer and 
buyers in the markets for staple grains, starchy 
root crops such as cassava, and pulses. Even perish­
able fruits and vegetables, when widely grown and 
intended for rural consumption, are usually sold on 
the spot market, although there are often informal 
relationships between farmers and buyers which 
may serve some of the functions of formal 
contracts.
M ore vertical coordination is required, however, 
for commodities with the following characteristics:
■ Economically important quality variation—  
Vertical coordination is more likely if con­
sumers are willing to  pay a premium for a 
variety or attribute that will cover the 
additional cost of producing it and the 
cost of vertical coordination. Farm-level 
investments in human capital [skills], physi­
cal capital [assets], or specialized inputs are 
required to raise quality. In this case, 
vertical coordination is needed to provide 
producers with the incentives and the 
means to make those investments.
■ High value-bulk ratio— A given percentage 
premium for higher quality is more likely 
to cover the incremental cost of con­
tracting if it is a high-value commodity.
■ High perishability— Not all perishable
goods are produced under contract, but 
the need for some form of vertical coor­
dination increases when the commodity is 
highly perishable. Perishability increases the 
need for farmers and buyers to coordinate 
the timing of harvest and delivery. In addi­
tion, a farmer's bargaining power is 
seriously weakened once the product is 
harvested unless there is a contract rela­
tionship that ensures a fixed price or at 
least a personal relationship that ensures a 
"fair" price.
■ Technically difficult production— If buyers 
can reduce the cost of production with 
technical expertise, specialized inputs, or 
credit, then vertical coordination is useful 
in transferring these resources to farmers. 
Farmers in developing countries may not
have the available cash to  purchase inputs 
at planting time, so the contract allows the 
buyer to provide them on credit and to 
recover the cost of the inputs by deduct­
ing it from the payment to farmers at 
harvest.
These factors imply that vertical coordination 
is needed for high-quality fruits and vegetables, 
organic products, spices, flowers, tea, tobacco, 
seed crops, and other quality-sensitive and 
perishable commodities. In dairy production, 
the high degree of perishability and the impor­
tance of quality encourage vertical coordina­
tion, including contract production and dairy 
cooperatives. Dairy cooperatives can be consi­
dered a form of vertical integration in that 
farmers jointly purchase and manage 
processing facilities. Medium- and large-scale 
poultry production is often organized in a 
contract farming arrangement, in which the 
processor provides chicks, feed, and medicine 
to contract farmers and takes the chickens at 
the end of the growing cycle. Poultry contracts 
are quite detailed, specifying many aspects of 
the production process. The processor retains 
legal ownership of the chickens, so the rela­
tionship is almost like home-based piecework, 
in which the grower provides labor and the 
production site and is paid based on the num­
ber of units produced. Part of the rationale for 
poultry contracting is that the processor is 
providing specialized inputs and production 
methods on credit. In Thailand, for example, 
virtually all commercially produced broilers are 
produced under contract, whereas the corres­
ponding figure for the Philippines is 80  
percent [Delgado et al. 2003],
An alternative to contract farming is vertical inte­
gration, in which the buyer owns farmland and 
engages in direct production of the commodity. In 
the choice between contracting and vertical inte­
gration, an important factor is the existence of 
economies of scale in production. If large-scale 
production of the commodity is more economical 
and large tracts are available for purchase or lease, 
then processors and exporters are more likely to 
vertically integrate into direct agricultural produc­
tion (Minot 1986], This is the case with bananas, 
pineapples, and sugarcane, for which large-scale 
production is generally less costly. For example,
pest control in banana production often involves 
aerial spraying, which implies economies of scale. In 
some countries, it is not possible to purchase or 
lease large plots of land, preventing processors 
from vertically integrating into production and 
forcing them to rely on contract production. In 
Kenya, Del Monte used to contract with medium- 
scale farmers to  grow pineapples, but when the 
government made long-term land leases available at 
concessionary rates, the firm switched from con­
tract production to  plantation production [Minot 
and Ngigi 200 4 ]. Vertical integration has the 
advantage of tight control over production deci­
sions, but the disadvantages of inflexible productive 
capacity and high costs of supervising day-wage 
laborers, who are less motivated than small-scale 
farmers.
Type o f destination market. The third factor is the 
destination market. The more quality-sensitive the 
final market and the more demand there is for 
food safety, the more incentive there is for vertical 
coordination to increase control over the produc­
tion process. The same commodity may be sold on 
the spot market for local rural consumers and 
grown under contract farming schemes for upscale 
urban supermarkets and exporters. Some 
researchers argue that tighter food safety standards 
in the United Kingdom are creating incentives for 
horticultural exporters in Kenya to switch from 
small-scale contract farmers to large-scale 
contractors and vertically integrated operations 
because it is difficult for the exporter to  monitor 
and document the production practices of many 
small-scale farmers (Dolan and Humphrey 2 0 0 0 ], In 
Shandong Province, China, apples for export to 
Japan are grown by vertically integrated orchards/ 
packing houses, whereas apples for sale to  urban 
supermarkets are often grown under contract and 
apples for local consumption are sold by farmers to 
wholesalers in spot markets (Hu 2005],
Another example in which the same commodity is 
grown with and without vertical coordination 
depending on the destination market is organic 
food production. Processors and exporters often 
establish contract farming schemes to procure 
organic products, partly to ensure that organic 
methods are in fact used. In some cases, particularly 
in developing countries, buyers may contract with 
farmers as a way of assisting them with organic 
food production methods. The profitability of 
organic food production depends, of course, on
consumers' willingness to pay a premium that 
covers both the additional cost of production (due 
to lower yields] and the cost of monitoring and 
certifying. For example, although rice is rarely 
grown under contract, organic rice production is 
often organized under a contract farming scheme 
(see Setboonsarng et al. 2006].
A  third example is seed production. Seeds must be 
grown under carefully monitored conditions to 
minimize the risk of seed-borne diseases, mixture of 
weed seed, or mixture with other varieties of the 
same crop. This process involves starting with 
healthy seed that is varietally pure, monitoring the 
field closely, controlling weeds effectively, and iso­
lating fields from fields with other varieties, all of 
which add to production costs. Sometimes seed 
companies use their own fields (vertical inte­
gration], particularly for early generations of seed 
multiplication. But often they use contract farmers, 
particularly for the later generations, to reduce the 
costs of production and achieve larger volumes. 
Farmers would be reluctant to take these additional 
measures unless they were assured of a price pre­
mium above the price of the food crop (Simmons 
et al. 2005],
Impact of Contract Farming on Small 
Farmers
The impact of contract farming on small farmers 
can be divided into two issues. First, how does con­
tract farming affect smallholders who are partici­
pating in the contract farming scheme? Second, do 
small farmers participate in contract farming 
schemes, or are they excluded? This section sum­
marizes the results of previous research on these 
topics.
Impact o f contract farming on the income o f par­
ticipating farmers. Economic logic would suggest 
that well-informed farmers will not voluntarily 
enter into contracts with buyers unless they believe 
there will be benefits. Because of the possibility of 
misperceptions or lack of information, however, it 
is worth examining the empirical research. Research 
on contract farming in developing countries is 
fairly extensive, going back to the 1970s. In an early 
review of the literature, Minot (1986] finds that 
most studies suggest that farmers benefit from 
contract farming because it provides them with 
inputs on credit, technical assistance, and often a 
guaranteed price, allowing them to produce a
higher-value commodity than would otherwise be 
possible. O ther studies provide a more skeptical 
view of the benefits of contract farming. Little and 
Watts (1994) compile a set of seven case studies of 
contract farming in Sub-Saharan Africa. The case 
studies focus on the historical and political context 
of contract farming, conflicts between farmers and 
the contracting firms, the imbalance of power be­
tween the two parties, intrahousehold tensions over 
the division of labor and the allocation of new 
revenues, and the increasing rural inequality as 
contract farmers grow wealthy enough to hire farm 
laborers. In his summary of the cases, Little (1994, 
221) concludes that "incomes from contract 
farming increased for a moderate ( 3 0 - 4 0  percent) 
to a high ( 5 0 - 6 0  percent) proportion of partici­
pants." This income was not enough to live on, 
however, and farmers had to rely on other farm 
and nonfarm income. In several cases, households 
lost land that was appropriated for government-run 
contract farming schemes.
In a review of the experience of contract farming in 
Africa in the early 1990s, Porter and Phillips- 
Howard (1997) conclude that farmers were generally 
better off as a result of their participation in 
contract farming, in spite of a number of social 
problems that arose in the communities. Singh 
(2002) identifies a series of problems associated 
with contract vegetable production in the state of 
Punjab in India: imbalanced power between farmers 
and companies, violation of the terms of the 
agreements, social differentiation, and environ­
mental unsustainability. Nonetheless, his surveys 
reveal that most farmers have seen incomes rise 
since joining the scheme and are generally satisfied 
with the contract arrangement.
There is some evidence that contract farming leads 
to a sharing of risks between the producer and the 
purchaser. Birthal et al. (2005) show that, in the 
case of poultry farmers in India, the coefficient of 
variation (CV) of the profits of contract farmers is 
lower than the CV of profits of noncontract 
farmers. Because there was not much variation in 
yield, price volatility was the main reason for high 
variability in profits of independent growers.
Birthal et al. (2005) also examine contract produc­
tion of vegetables and milk in India. They find that 
vegetable contract farmers received prices that 
were 8 percent higher than those received by non­
contract growers, and contract milk producers
received prices that were 4  percent higher. Other 
things being equal, agroprocessors find it more 
advantageous to deal with a small number of larger 
suppliers of raw materials than with a large number 
of smaller suppliers. Working with small farmers, 
however, often has offsetting advantages. Birthal et 
al. (2005) observe that firms in India often found it 
more convenient to contract with smallholders and 
their associations for several reasons:
■ lower risk for overall supply in the event 
of crop failure of one or few farmers;
■ higher quality thanks to labor-intensive 
management; and
■ lower costs due to lower implicit wage 
rates.
Warning and Key (2002) study contract farming in 
groundnuts in Senegal. NOVASEN, a private com­
pany, contracted with 3 2 ,0 0 0  growers and pro­
duced approximately 4 0 ,0 0 0  tons of groundnuts 
annually. Warning and Key found that the increase 
in gross agricultural revenues associated with con­
tracting is statistically significant and large, equal to 
about 55 percent of the average revenue of non­
contract farmers.
Another study, carried out in Indonesia by 
Simmons et al. (2005), examined contract growers 
of poultry, seed maize, and seed rice. The contracts 
for poultry and seed maize resulted in improved 
returns to capital, whereas no significant impact 
was found in the case of seed rice. Simmons et al. 
conclude that the contracts increased income and 
welfare, reducing absolute poverty.
Ramaswami et al. (2006) studied poultry growers 
with and without contracts in India. They found 
that average gross margins were similar between 
contract growers and others, but the regression 
analysis indicated significant gains from contracting. 
The explanation is that contract growers were less 
experienced and had less access to credit than 
other growers. Thus, they gained more from the 
management assistance and the credit provided by 
the firm than would more capable farmers who 
already had access to credit. Consequently, the 
incomes of contract farmers were significantly 
higher than they would have been without the con­
tract, but only slightly higher than the incomes of 
the more-skilled independent growers. In addition, 
the authors also show that the variability of gross
margins across production cycles was much lower 
for contract growers than for independent 
growers, revealing another benefit of contracting.
Although numerous studies confirm that contract 
farmers gain from participation, the studies also 
show that there are frequent violations of the 
terms of the contract by buyers or farmers. In 
some cases, market prices rise and farmers try to 
sell to other buyers, avoiding repayment of the 
input credit. In other cases, prices fall and the 
processor buys supplies from the open market, 
imposing strict quality standards on the contrac­
tors to avoid purchasing from them at the agreed 
price. Since the contracts are generally not legally 
enforceable,3 the only leverage the firm has is to 
refuse to work with the farmer in the future. 
Similarly, the main leverage of farmers is to with­
draw from the scheme or to bring the case to local 
officials for intervention. Indeed, an earlier review 
of the history of contract farming schemes in 
Kenya indicates a fair amount of turnover, as old 
schemes collapse and new ones are launched [Jaffee 
1994).
Thus, the weight of evidence suggests that 
successful contract farming schemes generally raise 
the incomes of farmers who join them. The cases 
where contract farming does not improve farm 
income (or at least reduce income volatility) are 
often short-lived as the scheme collapses.
Participation o f small-scale farmers in contract 
farming schemes. Even if farmers benefit from their 
contractual relations with processors and exporters, 
there is still the issue of whether small-scale farmers 
are able to participate in contract farming schemes. 
Some critics of contract farming argue that firms 
tend to work with medium- and large-scale farmers 
(Little and Watts 1994; Singh 2002). If so, contract 
farming may be an interesting institutional 
mechanism for vertical coordination, but it would 
have less relevance for poverty reduction strategies. 
In fact, by contributing to income inequality, it 
may exacerbate tensions between social groups in 
rural areas. O ther things being equal, firms would 
generally rather work with a small number of larger 
farmers rather than a large number of small-scale
3 Although the contract may be legally binding in 
theory, it is often not worthwhile to either party given 
the high cost of bringing the case to court relative to 
the value in dispute.
farmers. The transaction costs associated with 
negotiation, technical assistance, the monitoring of 
quality, and collection of harvest would certainly be 
less if the firm works with a smaller number of 
larger farmers. All other factors, however, are not 
equal. Most important, the family labor used by 
small-scale farmers has a lower implicit wage rate 
than the wage laborers hired by medium- and large- 
scale farmers. In addition, family labor is better mo­
tivated than hired laborers to respond to problems 
such as disease or pest attack as they occur during 
the crop cycle.
A  number of studies examine the proportion of 
contract farmers that are smallholders, as an indi­
cator of the pro-poor impact of contracting. Guo 
et al. (2005) use data from farm-level surveys in 
China covering several products to estimate the 
likelihood of participating in a contract farming 
scheme as a function of household characteristics, 
crop mix, and farm size. The results show that small 
farmers are less likely to participate in contract 
farming than larger farmers.
Key and Runsten (1999) look at contract farming in 
the tomato-processing industry in Mexico. Multi­
national agroprocessors from the United States 
first contracted with large growers but then 
involved small growers, partly because as a lucrative 
market for fresh tomatoes developed, firms found 
it increasingly difficult to enforce contracts they 
had with larger growers.
In the study of groundnuts in Senegal cited earlier, 
Warning and Key (2002) compared contract and 
independent farmers by various measures of assets. 
They found that indicators of asset ownership were 
not significant predictors of participation in the 
contract farming scheme, suggesting that con­
tractors were typical rural households. In the study 
of contract farming in Indonesia, Simmons et al. 
(2005) found that contract seed growers had larger 
farms than independent growers, but contract 
poultry producers tended to be smaller than inde­
pendent poultry growers.
A few studies give examples of buyers shifting 
from small-scale to large-scale farmers or the 
reverse. One example, cited in World Bank (2006), 
is an exporter in Thailand that started producing its 
own horticultural products on company land and 
later shifted to smallholder contract production. 
Minot and Ngigi (2 0 0 4 ) describe the evolution of
several contract farming schemes in Kenya, includ­
ing one [Del Monte pineapple] that gave up on 
contract production and shifted to vertically inte­
grated plantation production. Others have shifted 
from large-scale to small-scale production. In 
Senegal, green bean exporters switched from small- 
scale contract production to large-scale contract 
production [Maartens and Swinnen 2006], These 
findings confirm that the comparative advantage of 
smallholders is not a static concept, but it can 
change as farmers and buyers experiment and learn 
from experience. One study in Costa Rica found 
that younger, less experienced growers were more 
likely to grow under contract [Saenz and Ruben 
200 4 ], The fact that contract farming schemes 
occasionally switch from large-scale to small-scale 
farmers suggests that the cost differences between 
them is small, which implies that public policy may 
be able to  play a role in encouraging the partici­
pation of small farmers in these supply chains.
Stakeholders
Contract farming involves at least five types of 
stakeholders. This section examines the interests 
and motivations of each stakeholder.
Contracting Firm
The contracting firm is usually a medium- or large- 
scale processor, exporter, or supermarket chain. 
One of the firm's main interests is in obtaining a 
steady flow of high-quality agricultural products at 
the lowest price possible.4 It faces difficult deci­
sions: it is easier to work with a small number of 
large farmers, particularly if they have the financial 
and technical resources to produce a high-quality 
product throughout the year. On the other hand, 
large-scale farmers may be harder to  bargain with 
[particularly if they organize themselves], and the 
firm may be wary of becoming too dependent on 
them. It may face political pressure from the gov­
ernment to  show that it is working with small 
farmers and helping promote rural development. 
The firm also faces competitive pressures from 
other buyers of the commodity, who may try to 
divert the contracted output, and from others in
4 Firms may have other motives as well. Seed companies 
often contract seed multiplication in order to control the 
intellectual property embodied in the seed variety.
the same sector, who may undercut their prices. 
And a constant source of risk is the fact that one 
highly publicized case of food poisoning could put 
their entire business strategy at risk.
Participating Farmers
Farmers who participate in a contract farming 
scheme generally do so of their own volition, but 
there are frequent sources of tension with the con­
tracting firm. Some farmers may suspect that the 
quality of inputs is poor. Others may be confused 
or suspicious of the criteria used by the firm to 
grade their harvest, because the grade determines 
the price the firm will pay. When market prices are 
high, farmers may be tempted to sell some of their 
harvest on the open market, but they risk losing 
their place in the scheme if discovered. There may 
also be concern about the possibility that the firm 
will start to contract with a different set of farmers 
who can undercut them or offer better quality. 
Alternatively, the firm could decide to  vertically 
integrate by leasing land and growing its own 
product with hired laborers.
Nonparticipating Farmers
Farmers who do not participate in a contract 
farming scheme may envy the access to inputs, 
credit and the guaranteed market that participating 
farmers enjoy. A t the same time, they may be 
unsure if it is worth joining given some of the 
complaints they hear about the company. More 
commonly, they may not be able to join the 
scheme because of some criteria established by the 
firm regarding location, farm size, irrigation, assets, 
and/or literacy. Still other farmers may have been 
contract farmers in the past but left the scheme, 
either because they believe they have the skills to 
market the product themselves or perhaps because 
they were caught selling on the side and lost the 
contract.
Government
Government officials are generally pleased to  have 
a formal-sector agribusiness firm because it gene­
rates tax revenue and may contribute to exports. 
Furthermore, the firm creates employment and 
shows that the government is addressing the prob­
lems of rural areas. A t the same time, the firm may 
frequently pressure the government for extensions
on its tax concessions, for better roads to the 
factory, and for more reliable electricity. For a 
given size of operation, government officials would 
generally prefer that the firm work with more 
small-scale farmers and pay better prices, but they 
are also aware that if costs rise too much, the firm 
may relocate its operations to another country 
where labor costs are lower.
Farmer Organizations or Nongovernmental 
Organizations
Often a cooperative, farmers' organization, or non­
governmental organization [NGO] plays the role of 
intermediary between farmers and the company. 
This arrangement has the potential to reduce the 
transaction costs for the firm in communicating 
with farmers, distributing inputs, and collecting the 
harvest. N G O s are often involved in farmer 
training and input delivery, whereas cooperatives 
and farmer organizations are more likely to be 
involved in collecting the harvest for the company 
and other organizational tasks. The organization 
tries to  represent the interests of farmers to the 
company to get better prices or clearer rules on 
grading. But it also realizes that, if it pushes too 
hard, the company could choose to work directly 
with farmers, cutting the organization out of the 
system, or it could work with farmers in other 
districts.
Policy Options
Developing countries can promote pro-poor 
contract farming by creating a conducive policy 
environment. In particular, the following policy 
goals should be considered:
■ a favorable investment climate;
■ deregulation of direct transactions between 
companies and farms;
■ development of grades and standards;
■ facilitation of farmer organizations to link 
farmers and firms;
■ cooperation with private firms on provi­
sion of extension services;
■ promotion of competition;
■ provision of mediation services; and
■ exploration of innovative ways to enforce 
contracts.
Improve the Investment Climate
As already discussed, contract farming schemes are 
usually organized by large-scale processors, 
exporters, or chains of supermarkets. Thus, an 
investment climate that facilitates private invest­
ment in agribusiness sectors is a necessary pre­
condition for the development of private contract 
farming schemes. This improved climate involves 
reducing unnecessarily high capital requirements to 
start new firms, streamlining registration proce­
dures, limiting licensing requirements to sectors in 
which public health or safety is an issue [such as 
pesticide distribution], developing a fair and trans­
parent tax code, simplifying customs clearance pro­
cedures, adopting a modern commercial and legal 
code, and minimizing corruption.
Legalize Direct Firm-Farm Contracts
The government can facilitate contract farming and 
other forms of vertical coordination by removing 
legal restrictions that prevent firms from buying 
directly from farmers in some countries. Although 
designed to protect farmers' interests, these 
regulations often serve only to impose the use of 
an intermediary organization, such as a cooperative, 
which may increase marketing costs. The 
government's role should be to ensure that both 
parties to an agreement understand and accept the 
terms.
Develop Effective Grades and Standards
The establishment of grades and standards that are 
easy to implement and that reflect attributes 
demanded by consumers will facilitate 
communication and negotiation between buyers 
and farmers and among traders. It will also make it 
easier for buyers to establish contracts with 
farmers, given that quality control and grading are 
often contentious issues in farmer-buyer relations 
within contract farming schemes. The government 
may also have a role in certifying compliance with 
private grades and standards, such as EUREGAP, a 
set of standards developed and adopted by a 
consortium of European supermarkets.
Facilitate Farmer Organizations and Other 
Intermediaries
Contract farming schemes involving large numbers 
of small farmers often make use of an intermediary 
organization. A  cooperative, an N G O , or even a 
large-scale farmer may serve as a link between the 
firm and small-scale farmers. The activities of local 
officials and extension agents can play a role in 
allowing and even promoting the development of 
such intermediary organizations, which reduce the 
transaction cost associated with dealing with a large 
number of small farmers. The organizations should, 
however, involve voluntary membership by farmers 
and voluntary contractual relations with firms to 
ensure that they are productive.
Promote Public-Private Partnerships in 
Extension
Traditionally, extension services have concentrated 
on providing technical assistance in the production 
of staple crops. As farmers diversify into high-value 
commercial crops, extension services must adapt by 
providing assistance on a wider range of crops and 
by providing more marketing assistance. Contract 
farming schemes often use cooperatives, N GO s, 
extension agents, and local officials as inter­
mediaries. If extension services have the flexibility 
to provide services on behalf of the contracting 
firm and the incentive to serve small-scale farmers, 
it reduces the cost to the firm of working with 
small-scale farmers. O f course, the rationale for 
providing extension services is stronger if the 
scheme is working with small-scale contract 
farmers.
Promote Competition
One of the biggest concerns about contract 
farming is the fact that firms seem to have much 
greater market power and leverage than do the 
farmers who bargain with them. One of the best 
approaches for limiting this power is to allow or 
promote competition among firms. Policymakers 
should be reluctant to offer regional monopsony 
power that agribusiness firms sometimes seek.5 
This practice is particularly common in the cotton 
and sugarcane sectors. A t the same time, it is
5 Monopsony refers to a situation in which there is only 
one buyer of a commodity, in contrast to a monopoly, 
where there is just one seller.
important to recognize that competition makes it 
easier for farmers to obtain inputs and credit from 
one company and then sell the harvest to another 
company, thus avoiding repayment of the loan. 
There are, however, better methods of enforcing 
contracts than by granting regional monopsonies.
Provide Mediation Services
One of the most common problems in contract 
farming is violation of the contract. If the market 
price rises during the agricultural season, farmers 
are tempted to sell to other buyers, particularly 
since doing so means they can avoid repaying the 
input credit. On the other hand, if the market 
price falls, the buyer is tempted to procure raw 
materials on the open market. The buyer may apply 
quality standards more strictly under such circums­
tances, reducing its obligation to purchase from 
contract growers. If these abuses are widespread, 
they can lead to loss of confidence and possibly the 
collapse of the contract farming scheme. Govern­
ment officials, particularly extension officers, some­
times play a role in mediating between contract 
growers and the buyer. Alternatively, they could 
help organize a nongovernmental mediation board 
with members acceptable to both sides. This is an 
area where there are no clear, widely applicable 
models, but one that deserves more attention.
Enforce Contracts
The government should explore alternative 
approaches to enforcing contracts, particularly 
between buyers and farmers. In countries with 
more advanced legal systems, this enforcement 
could be accomplished by establishing small-claims 
courts. In other countries, it may involve collecting 
and disseminating information on noncompliance 
on the part of both farmers and buyers. Providing 
better information about noncompliance will 
increase the incentives for farmers and firms to 
comply and help each party avoid high-risk busi­
ness partners. In Benin the government has estab­
lished a clearinghouse for information on farmers 
who are producing cotton and receiving inputs on 
credit. This information makes it easier to punish 
both the farmer who violates the terms of his or 
her contract and the buyer who knowingly pur­
chases cotton from growers who have contracts 
with other companies.
Assignment
Your assignment is to  recommend a set of policies 
to be considered by a developing-country govern­
ment to  facilitate contract farming for fruits and 
vegetables that will benefit low-income farmers, 
taking into account stakeholders' interests.
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